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Abstract—In standard implementations of distributed sec-
ondary control for DC MicroGrids (MGs), the exchange of local
measurements among neighboring control agents is enabled via
off-the-shelf wireless solutions, such as IEEE 802.11. However,
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on the wireless interface through
jamming prevents the secondary control system from performing
its main tasks, which might compromise the stability of the
MG. In this paper, we propose novel, robust and secure sec-
ondary control reconfiguration strategy, tailored to counteract
DoS attacks. Specifically, upon detecting the impairment of the
wireless interface, the jammed secondary control agent notifies
its peers via a secure, low-rate powerline channel based on
Power Talk communication. This triggers reconfiguration of the
wireless communication graph through primary control mode
switching, where the jammed agents leave the secondary control
by switching to current source mode, and are replaced by non-
jammed current sources that switch to voltage source mode and
join the secondary control. The strategy fits within the software-
defined networking framework, where the network control is
split from the data plane using reliable and secure side power
talk communication channel, created via software modification of
the MG primary control loops. The simulation results illustrate
the feasibility of the solution and prove that the MG resilience
and performance can be indeed improved via software-defined
networking approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of affordable and efficient Distributed En-
ergy Resources (DERs) based on renewable generation stimu-
lated the development of small, localized and self-sustainable
direct current (DC) MicroGrids (MG). MGs are regulated
and optimized through hierarchical control system, comprising
primary, secondary and tertiary control loops, implemented in
the power electronic converters that interface DERs to the DC
distribution infrastructure [1]. The primary control maintains
the electric variables within predefined margins to guarantee
MG stability; it is implemented in a decentralized manner,
relying only on local measurements as feedback. The upper
(secondary/tertiary) controls restore the voltage to its nominal
reference and optimize the power flow; they are commonly
implemented in either centralized or distributed manner, via
consensus algorithm and require exchange of local information
among neighboring control agents [2].
In standard implementations, low cost, off-the-shelf wire-
less communication solutions, such as IEEE 802.11 WiFi
standards, are used to support the upper level control [3].
It is well known that the WiFi systems are vulnerable to
specific types of security attacks by malicious entities; Denial-
of-Service (DoS) is an example of such attack, which can be
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Fig. 1: Control diagram and information flow in VSC DER
equipped with power talk modem.
easily conducted through jamming [4]. The effects of DoS
attacks on distributed secondary control have been investigated
in [5]. It was shown that DoS attacks lead to prolonged
communication outages, splitting the communication graph
and preventing the secondary controllers from restoring the
voltage and keeping the current sharing balance. This results
in poor voltage regulation, generator over-loading, circulating
currents and instability [6].
In this paper we introduce a novel, secure and robust
strategy for distributed secondary control based on dynamic
reconfiguration of the communication network, using an aux-
iliary low-rate powerline communication (PLC) interface that
is based on power talk [7], [8], [9]. Power talk is a recent
communication technique where the information messages are
modulated into the parameters of the primary droop control
loops of voltage source controllers (VSC), see Fig. 1. This
incurs steady state voltage disturbances from which the in-
formation can be demodulated by remote controllers. Unlike
existing PLC standards, power talk does not require installa-
tion of dedicated hardware, as it is implemented by software
modifications of the primary control loops. In our solution,
each controller monitors the wireless channel and uses power
talk to periodically broadcast a list of peer controllers from
which it can receive information over the WiFi interface. The
power talk broadcasts are received by all other controllers in
the MG, irrespective whether the controller operates as VSC
and actively participates into secondary control, or current
source controller (CSC) that does not participate in secondary
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control. When a VSC detects that the wireless interface is
under DoS attack, it notifies the remaining controllers by
sending an empty list, which triggers a graph reconfiguration
mechanism. Specifically, the jammed VSCs switch to CSC
mode and leave the secondary control, while one or more
CSCs switch to VSC mode and join the secondary control. The
PLECS R© based simulation results show that the secondary
control regulation can be successfully maintained after DoS
attack.
The proposed solution can be seen as a specific instance of
more general software-defined communication-control frame-
work [10]. In particular, the MG agents use simple software
upgrades of the secure and reliable power electronic equipment
as a side, low-rate communication channel to exchange control
(i.e., power talk) data for network reconfiguration, splitting the
network control from the data plane and increasing the overall
MG resilience and performance. To the best of our knowledge,
the present paper is the first work that applies the software-
defined networking paradigms in the context of MG system
with high penetrations of power electronic converters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the DoS attacks against IEEE 802.11 networks, as
well as jamming detection mechanisms. Section III introduces
the system model. Section IV presents the proposed recon-
figuration strategy against DoS attacks. Section V verifies the
viability of the strategy through PLECS R© -based simulations.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. JAMMING ATTACKS TO IEEE 802.11 SYSTEMS
A jamming attack against an IEEE 802.11 system can lead
to severe communication outages, even if the jammer is located
at a considerable distance from the MG. A malicious attacker
equipped with a jammer can try to corrupt control packets
of the protocol, as well as emitting noise, e.g., transmiting
packets that do not comply with the protocol to prevent the
reception [11]. If the jammer is able to produce a continuous
noise, the effect is the back-off freezing at the transmitter side.
In this case it may not even possible to find idle slots for the
packet transmission.
Many countermeasures to this DoS attack are considered
in literature, ranging from the channel hopping to the direct
sequence spread spectrum [4]. Uncoordinated adaptations for
these techniques are also presented for the broadcast networks
[12]. Also, the use of directional antennas can be considered
to mitigate the interference, although they reduce the spatial
coverage, i.e., the number of links among nodes [13].
The jamming detection, which can be implemented locally
in each device, is based on various metrics, like the energy
reported by the Carrier Senser, the Carrier Sensing Time or
the packet error probability [4], [11].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Grid Model and Control Architecture
A DC MG comprises U DERs indexed in U = {1, ..., U};
the DERs are connected in parallel, jointly supplying a com-
mon load with aggregate power demand denoted with d.
Further, the DERs support dual control mode capability [14];
i.e., they can operate either in voltage source control or current
source control mode. We assume that V DERs from the subset
V ⊂ U are operating as VSCs, while the remaining U − V
DERs from the set U \ V are operated as CSCs.
1) Voltage source control mode: The DERs configured in
VSC mode are responsible of the voltage regulation and fos-
tering optimized and fair load sharing. The control architecture
of VSC DERs is organized in a hierarchy [6], comprising the
primary, secondary and tertiary levels.
The primary control regulates the output electrical param-
eters and balances the supply-demand to guarantee stability
based on local output measurements, via the droop law [6]:
vu = xu − ruiu, u ∈ V,
where vu and iu are the output voltage and current, xu is
the reference voltage and ru is the virtual resistance. This
implementation is known as decentralized droop control. The
value vu serves as input reference to the inner primary control
loops that operate with frequency fpc, equal to the sampling
frequency of the converters’ ADC. The droop controller con-
trols xu and ru, where xu determines the voltage rating of
the system, while the ru determines the load sharing among
different DERs. Note that under primary control, the output
voltage varies with load variations. Moreover, the load current
will not be adequately shared among generators as dictated by
the virtual resistances, due to mismatched line admittances.
The secondary control is slower than the primary control,
operating with sampling period T sc, and has two main ob-
jectives: (i) upon load variation, it restores the voltage to the
nominal value v?, and (ii) it fosters proportional power sharing
among generators. This is achieved by adding correction
offsets of the reference voltage control parameter. Commonly,
it is implemented in distributed manner, where each unit
implements two proportional-integral (PI) controllers fed by
the output of a consensus algorithm [2]. For this purpose,
in this work we adopt robust broadcast gossiping [3], which
performs well under communication outages. The secondary
control operation can be outlined in the following steps:
1) in the secondary control period k, DER u ∈ V broadcasts
a packet to the neighboring control agents over the
wireless interface with payload au(k) = [v¯u(k), i¯u(k)],
representing local estimates of the average voltage and
output current, respectively,
2) during the same secondary control period, DER u re-
ceives R packets from neighboring agents, which are
supplied as input to the robust broadcast gossip algorithm:
au(k+1) =
{
βumu(k) + (1− βu)
∑
j aj(k)
R , R > 0
mu(k), R = 0
where mu(k) = [v˜u(k), i˜u(k)] is the local measurement
vector in secondary control period k, aj(k) is the status of
agent j (assumed to be within the communication range
of agent u) and βu ∈ (0, 1) is the consensus weight for
agent u; in this paper we adopt that βu = V −1,∀u ∈ V;1
3) the new status au(k+1) is then forwarded to the local PI
controllers, together with the measurement vector mu(k);
4) the PI controllers generate the reference voltage correc-
tion signals δxc and δxv, used to modify the local droop
controller to restore the output voltage to the rated value
v?:
v?u = xu + δx
c + δxv − ruiu, u ∈ V.
After a load/generation change, the offsets δxc and δxv con-
verge to stable values when a global consensus is reached.
The addition of these two correction signals to the droop
law provides a global voltage regulation reference and fosters
proportional load sharing.
Finally, the tertiary control optimizes the performance of
the system in terms of minimizing the production costs,
enables the coordination with other MGs and operates with
significantly larger sampling periods T tc, e.g., 5−30 minutes.
2) Current source control mode: If in CSC mode, the inner
voltage control loop is absent and the DER does not participate
in voltage regulation. Rather, the reference for the inner current
control loop is usually generated through Maximum Power
Point Tracking (MPPT) algorithm to maximize the individual
efficiency [1]. It is modeled as a constant current generator
(with internal resistance) with injection current icscu , u ∈ U \V ,
determined by the MPPT. From the perspective of efficient
resource utilization, it is desired that significant portion of the
DERs are operated in CSC mode, for most of the time [14].
3) Communication for secondary control: To support sec-
ondary control, only VSC units are required to transmit packets
containing local measurements, while CSC units need not
to. For the purpose of making the proposed reconfiguration
scheme more resilient to malicious DoS attackers, in our
model we impose the requirement that CSC units transmit
dummy beacons, regularly and with the same frequency as the
rest of the VSC units. This comes at the price of increased
wireless channel load and increased probability for collisions;
nevertheless, taking into account the duration of the secondary
control periods, the low number of DERs in typical MG setups,
and the short length of the exchanged messages, the channel
load is expected to remain within tolerable levels. Finally, even
in case of congestion, the robust consensus algorithm has been
verified to cope very well with large packet drop rates [3].
B. The Wireless Communication Interface
In our model, each DER is equipped with an IEEE 802.11
interface. From this perspective, the DERs are WiFi Stations
(STA) that form an ad-hoc, multi-hop network that relies on
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) for medium access
[15], see Fig. 2. The communication range of STAs is denoted
with ρ. We assume that each DER has at least one neighbor
in its communication range; this implies that the graph G
1Notice that the robustness of this solution is provided by the fact that in
the case when R = 0, the consensus outputs the local measurements mu(k),
instead of the local state vector au(k).
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the proposed idea (dashed lines represent
wireless links, full lines represent powerlines). The blue VSC
compose the set V . The jammer is able to split the com-
munication graph. After reconfiguration, the jammed agent is
switched to CSC mode (the green CSC), and previously non-
participating CSC is switched to VSC mode (the orange VSC),
forming the set V ′ and reconnecting the graph.
representing the WiFi network is fully connected. Also, to
guarantee convergence of the secondary control, the subgraph
GV , formed by the secondary control agents should be also
fully connected. Since the packet arrivals in the controllers’
transmission queues are synchronized, a random delay T ad ∈
[0, τd] with τd < T sc is added to decorrelate the start of the
channel contentions.
C. Motivating Scenario: Jamming Attack
Assume a malicious attacker using a jamming device capa-
ble of emitting a continuous signal on the same frequencies
used by the WiFi interface [11]. The jammer has unlimited
energy but a limited transmission range equal to ρ, see Fig 2.
If a VSC DER is in the attacker transmission range, it can
neither transmit packets, because its DCF back-off counter is
frozen, nor it is able to receive. The attack leads to partitioning
of the communication graph GV into ω ≥ 1 subgraphs and loss
of global connectivity. The corresponding subsets of VSCs
are denoted with Vω , such that ∪ωVω = V . This disables the
secondary control system from performing its tasks properly.
Particularly, the current sharing will be misbalanced, creating
generators over-loading and circulating currents. This situa-
tion can be particularly threatening in larger, interconnected
systems of MG clusters; loosing the connectivity between the
clusters will lead to disproportionate current flows among the
cluster, compromising the cost efficiency and stability, and
might damage the equipment.
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Fig. 3: Time organization of the proposed power talk-based reconfiguration strategy.
D. Power Talk
Power talk is a communication technique that conveys
information by varying the droop control parameters of the
VSC DERs [7], see Fig. 1. Therefore, the secondary control of
all the VSCs should be disabled during the power talk. A VSC
DER u participating in power talk maps the information sym-
bols in the variations of its local reference voltage xu, resulting
in disturbances of the grid voltage that can be measured by all
other DERs (both VSCs and CSCs). In this paper, we employ
binary power talk introduced in [7], where only one DER
transmits at a time in TDMA fashion. Specifically, from power
talk perspective, the time axis is slotted into power talk slots
of duration T pt and all communicating DERs are synchronized
on slot level. Label the power talk transmitter in a power talk
slot with u and the receiver with j. The information messages,
represented as binary strings, are mapped into binary stream
of deviations of xu in the transmitters’ droop control loop:
0 ↔ xu − γ,
1 ↔ xu + γ,
The deviation amplitude γ satisfies γxu  1, see [7] for
discussion on how to choose γ. Further, these deviations lead
to deviations of the output voltage of the receiving DER:
0 ↔ vj −∆vj(0),
1 ↔ vj + ∆vj(1),
where vj corresponds to γ = 0. The receiver collects
fpc(T
pt− τ) steady state output voltage samples v˜j [n] in each
slot, compares their average to the threshold vj , and makes
decision on the information bits:
if
1
fpc(T pt − τ)
∑
n
v˜j [n] > vj , decide 1,
if
1
fpc(T pt − τ)
∑
n
v˜j [n] < vj , decide 0.
Notice that τ denotes the transient interval in which the bus
reaches a steady state.
The above detection scheme is challenged by two major
impairments: (i) the susceptibility of the primary control
level to sporadic load variations during the periods in which
the secondary control is off, and (ii) sampling noise of the
converters’ ADC. Specifically, in the above scheme, a load
change invalidates the detection threshold vj , which might
lead to burst of bit errors. A simple strategy to deal with this
impairment is to employ load change detection (by tracking
the output voltage level), in parallel with power talk symbol
transmission/detection, both in the transmitter and the receiver
[7]. After detecting load change, the transmission is paused, M
“blank” power talk slots, i.e., slots with γ = 0, are inserted and
the communicating DERs measure the new steady state output
voltage level, which is used as the new detection threshold.
The viability of this technique is verified in Section V.
Further, the sampling noise of the converter follows Gaussian
distribution [16], i.e., v˜j [n] ∼ N (vj + ∆vj(b), σ2), where
typical values for σ range from 10−2 to 10−4 [8]. A channel
code can be employed to protect the information messages
messages against noise-related errors.
IV. SECURE AND ROBUST ANTI-JAMMING STRATEGY
BASED ON POWER TALK
Here we describe the secure and robust graph reconfigura-
tion scheme when the secondary control system is under DoS
attack. The strategy relies on the following idea: when the
wireless interfaces of one or more secondary control agents
are attacked and the graph GV is disconnected, new connected
graph, denoted with GV′ can be formed by reconfiguring the
set of secondary control agents; specifically, previously non-
participating CSC DERs in U\V can be switched to VSC mode
and join the reconfigured set of secondary control agents V ′ ,
while the jammed agents are switched to CSC mode and join
the subset U \ V ′ . Fig. 2 illustrates the described concepts.
In this paper, we adopt the following graph reconfiguration
strategy. We impose to keep V (i.e., the number of VSCs in
the system) constant to guarantee the same voltage restoration
capability.2 Each DER constructs U × U binary matrix Q
where entry [Q]u,j = 1 if DER u ∈ U can receive from
DER j ∈ U over the wireless interface and 0 otherwise.
Finally, using Q and a predetermined metric matrix M of
dimensions U ×U , the new set V ′ is constructed. The matrix
M can be chosen according to different criteria. For instance,
VSC units can be chosen such that the link distances are
maximized, in order to mitigate the effect of the jammer.3 If
the DER’ positions are unknown, the metric can be based on
other parameters, e.g., the Received Signal Strength Indicator
(RSSI) of the neighbors’ packets.
The matrix Q is constructed by each DER using informa-
tion broadcasted and received over the power talk interface.
Specifically, the power talk communication protocol is based
on periodic intervals named power talk channels (PTCh) of
duration T PTCh = DT sc, during which the secondary control is
suspended by each agent, as represented in Fig. 3. In addition,
all CSC units switch to VSC control mode to be able to use
the power talk transceiver, described in subsection III-D, for
the duration of the PTCh. Each PTCh occurs every LT sc, and
in each PTCh, the DERs transmit in TDMA fashion, using
predetermined number of power talk slots, see the brown slots
in Fig. 3. Particularly, each DER transmits a list of agents that
is able to receive information over the wireless interface, i.e.,
DER u transmits the elements of the u-th row of Q (except
for the element Q]u,u that is by default [Q]u,u = 1). This
is accomplished by allocating S(V − 1) power talk slots for
each DER, with S ≥ 1.4 The total duration of each PTCh
is US(V − 1). The jammed secondary control agents send
empty lists. At the end of a PTCh, all agents have knowledge
on Q and can verify the connectivity of GV . Specifically,
if the number of subgraphs is ω ≥ 2, the reconfiguration
is triggered. We emphasize that power talk is not used to
substitute the wireless channel in terms of secondary control,
due to its limitation of low bandwidth; it only serves as
a secure side channel to support the reconfiguration of the
wireless communication system; also, note that we set L 1
to avoid frequent interruptions of the secondary control, see
further discussion in Sec. VI. The new set V ′ is constructed
as follows: select the subset Vω with the greatest cardinality
and add it to V ′ . Then iteratively add other agents to V ′
until V ′ = V , by choosing among agents that are in the
transmission range of those already in V ′ . This information is
provided by Q and ensures that V ′ is connected (if it exists).
In case that more than one candidate is present, one of them
is chosen according to M. The fact that Q and M are known
by all agents ensures that they construct the same V ′ .
Finally, DERs decide their operational mode to accomplish
the new communication graph. This operation is also done
2This allows for keeping the consensus algorithm weight fixed, since we
adopted βu = V −1, ∀u ∈ V .
3In fact, enabling all the VSC unit in the same region will make easier to
the attacker to block the secondary control.
4Note that in the case when S = 1, each DER u directly maps [Q]u,j in the
corresponding power talk slot, using uncoded binary power talk modulation.
When S > 1, the DERs can also use some form of channel coding.
-200 -100 0 100
X [m]
0
100
200
300
Y 
[m
]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
(a) The graph before the reconfigura-
tion.
-200 -100 0 100
X [m]
0
100
200
300
Y 
[m
]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
(b) After the reconfiguration.
Fig. 4: Communication graph in the case study. A blue dashed
link exists if the distance is lower than ρ. A black continuous
line links DERs in V .
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Fig. 5: Simulation of generators’ currents and grid voltage
when the communication channel is clear and a load variation
happens at t = 4.5 s.
locally, since DER u can verify if u ∈ V ′ and eventually
switch from CSC to VSC mode if u /∈ V . On the contrary, if
u ∈ V , but u /∈ V ′ , u switches from VSC to CSC. For the
other cases, the control mode switch is not necessary.
V. RESULTS
The verification of the proposed strategy is done by means
of a case study that consists of a DC MG operating at
the nominal voltage of v? = 48 V. The minimum voltage
is vmin = v? − 10% = 43.2 V, which complies with
the standardization proposals [17]. The value of all virtual
resistances is rd = 0.3 Ω [14], imposing imax = 13 A.
The U = 9 DERs are interfaced to the bus by means of
buck DC-DC converters, interconnected by a Wi-Fi network
and randomly placed on a plane. Specifically, each DG is
equipped with a 802.11n wireless interface that operates in
ad-hoc mode. The V = 4 DGs operate as VSC, sending
UDP packets with a payload of 30 bytes every T sc = 0.025 s.
The communication radius ρ is determined by the path loss,
that in our case follows the log-distance model, adopted for
the densely populated environments. The path-loss exponent
is 3 and the reference loss 46.67 dB at 1 m, resulting in
ρ = 175 m. The network graph is reported in Fig. 4. The
described communication network is simulated using ns-3, the
controllers using MATLAB/Simulink and the power system
modelled in PLECS R©.
A. Verification of the Anti-Jamming Strategy
In the studied case the initial VSC set is V = {2, 5, 6, 9},
interconnected as shown in Fig. 4a. DERs belonging to this set
participate to the primary, secondary and tertiary control, while
the rest of them operate in CSC mode. If a load is plugged to
the grid, DERs in V equally increase their output current and
v becomes v? after the transient time, as reported in Fig. 5.5
In the second scenario, the jammer is positioned in prox-
imity of the grid, see the red node in Fig. 4, and activated at
t = 3 s. The attack results in the partition of the communica-
tion graph in the subsets {9}, {5}, {2, 6}. If no countermeasure
is taken, the output currents and the grid voltage evolve as
in Fig. 6: the two insulated DERs are underutilized, since the
last update from neighbors was received under a different load
condition, and the currents become unbalanced.
Finally, in Fig. 7 we present the result obtained with the
adoption of the proposed strategy. The first available PTCh
after the jamming detection starts at t = 5 s and has duration
T PTCh = 180 ms, where the power talk symbol period is 2.5 ms
and the information transmitted by each agent represented
by V − 1 bits. At the end of PTCh, agents discover that
GV is partitioned. According to Q, the partition with greatest
cardinality is {2, 6}, that is added to V ′, and other connected
DERs are {1, 4, 8}. The selection among these candidates is
based on M, which in this example contains the distances
between DERs, resulting in a new VSC set V ′ = {1, 2, 6, 8},
see Fig. 4b. The mode switches that happen at t = 5.18 s
are the following: DERs 1 and 8 from CSCs become VSC,
DERs 5 and 9 from VSCs become CSCs. It can be observed
that after a transient the currents are effectively equally shared
among VSC DERs and the voltage is restored, confirming the
validity of the proposed solution.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a novel and secure strategy
to overcome DoS attacks to the MG distributed secondary
control. Power talk is used as side communication channel to
implement the network control plane, that informs the DERs
in the system about the state of the wireless communication
network, due to its low complexity and its robustness against
malicious attackers that do not have physical access to the grid.
The reliability of the power talk channel makes it attractive
5Note that this result shows that the robust broadcast gossiping algorithm [3]
can be used for a multi-hop network with random channel access protocol,
which is beyond the scenario proposed in [3], where all DERs are within
communication distance of each other and round-robin scheduling is used.
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and viable side interface for separation of network control
and data plane and in the next generation DC MG. In fact,
while the wireless interface provides flexibility at the expense
of unreliable or insecure data exchange, the grid itself can
propagate the respective meta-data, and increase the overall
system resiliency in many different scenarios.
Although the DoS attack was mitigated in the case study,
an intelligent jammer may leverage on the knowledge of the
physical graph topology to insulate agents located in strategic
points. This may prevent formation of a new V ′ with the
desired cardinality, resulting in a reduced voltage restoration
capability of the system; e.g., for the communication graph of
the case study, simultaneous jamming of DERs 1, 2, and 5
prevents formation of any wireless communication graph with
V = 4 DERs. This kind of scenario can not be mitigated by
any algorithm that relies on reconfiguration of the wireless
communication graph with a predefined number of involved
nodes that is required by the control algorithm. Nevertheless,
in such cases, an alarm message can be transmitted on the
power talk channel to a dedicated grid authority. Furthermore,
power talk may be also used in such cases to agree on the
reduction of the generated power, i.e., disconnection of part
of the CSC DERs, in order to keep the MG in a controllable
regime. Our ongoing research also aims to evaluate if power
talk can entirely replace the wireless interface for disseminat-
ing of the secondary control information. However, because
of the low offered bandwidth, new control schemes able to
cope with limited and sporadic access to the communication
channel are needed.
The proposed strategy can be extended to more sophisti-
cated security threats, such as larger number of (coordinated)
jammers that exploit the limitations and vulnerabilities of the
physical configuration and topology of the MG as well as the
employed wireless technology. In this respect, there is a trade-
off between (i) the degrees of the nodes in the graph, (ii) the
transmission range and the number of the jammers/STAs, and
(iii) the number of agents performing the secondary control
V . Its characterization is part of our ongoing research.
Finally, we note that the proposed solution can be gener-
alized to a scenario where the MG is not attacked, but the
communication graph is adapted to compensate the variations
of the wireless channel. The splitting of network control plane
and data plane, together with the active participation of the MG
control in the network adaptation, results a promising research
topic and can have larger consequences on the MG design.
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